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of Property Rights in Developing 
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Abstract
It is often argued that countries with a high population share of children and young 
workers should attract large capital inﬂ   ows from aging industrialized economies. 
However, many of these countries deter foreign investors by a high risk of creeping 
or outright expropriation. In this paper we explore whether the correlation between 
countries’ demographic structure and the perceived security of property rights reﬂ  ects 
a causal relationship. We show that, once we control for other potential determinants 
of expropriation risk, the ratio of young to old workers has a positive eﬀ  ect on the 
perceived security of property rights in low-income countries. This eﬀ  ect is the stronger 
the more democratic the political system.
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Most industrialized economies exhibit a growing life expectancy and declin-
ing birth rates. In the medium run, this demographic evolution will raise
capital-labor ratios and reduce the returns to capital in these countries. As a
consequence, rich-country savers should be eager to purchase assets in coun-
tries with higher population growth rates and a lower capital-labor ratio.1
Unfortunately, many economies whose demographic structure should make
them attractive targets for international investors do not oﬀer a favorable
business climate. A bad infrastructure, low human capital or poor informa-
tion are obstacles to large international investments. In addition, potential
host countries are often characterized by corruption, non-democratic regimes,
weak legal systems and the risk of – outright or creeping – expropriation.2
The correlation between countries’ demographic structures and the security
of property rights is illustrated in Figure 1. For a sample of 167 countries
between 1984 and 2005, this scatterplot depicts the relationship between the
age structure of countries’ labor force – represented by the ratio of ”young
workers” (aged 15-39) to ”old workers” (aged 40-64) – and the ”Investment
Proﬁle” index, published in the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG).3
Apparently, countries with a younger labor force are characterized by lower
values of ICRG’s Investment Proﬁle index.
This creates a somewhat paradoxical situation: on the one hand, a high
share of young individuals should enhance international capital ﬂows to de-
veloping countries. On the other hand, such a favorable age distribution
seems to be associated with the very institutional failures and political risks
that deter foreign investors. Does this mean that a demographic structure
which is tilted towards the young prevents the international capital ﬂows that
it is supposed to instigate?
The goal of this paper is to explore this question in some detail. When
doing so, we need to take into account that the correlation shown in Fig-
ure 1 does not necessarily represent a causal eﬀect of countries’ demographic
structure on the security of property rights. It might as well result from the
1see Reisen (2000), Brooks (2003), the IMF (2004) and B¨ orsch-Supan et al. (2006)
2See e.g., Lucas (1990), Alfaro et al. (2008), Li and Resnick (2003), Jensen (2008),
Harms and Ursprung (2002), Busse and Hefeker (2007) and Harms (2002) for a discussion
on the role of institutions for international capital ﬂows.
3The Investment Proﬁle index assesses the likelihood of a broad spectrum of outright
or creeping expropriation, namely: (a) the risk of expropriation or contract viability, (b)
payment delays and (c) barriers to the repatriation of proﬁts. Each sub-component is
scored on a scale from zero (denoting very high risk) to four (denoting very low risk).
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Figure 1: The ratio of countries’ ratios of young to old workers and the
International Country Risk Guide ”Investment Proﬁle”index (5-year averages
for a panel of industrialized and developing economies)
fact that the age distribution of the labor force is correlated with other deter-
minants of the Investment Proﬁle index. To isolate the role of demographic
structure we therefore need to control for other variables that potentially
aﬀect this index. Moreover, we have to account for the possibility that the
eﬀect of demographic structure diﬀers across country groups and political
regimes.
Our main empirical result indicates that, ceteris paribus, a higher share of
young workers in the total labor force raises the ICRG’s investment proﬁle in-
dex in low-income countries – provided that the political system is suﬃciently
democratic. We argue that this pattern reﬂects the distinct distributional in-
terests of young and old agents in developing countries which, in turn, result
from cohorts’ diﬀerent time horizons, factor ownership etc. The relevance of
this political-economic explanation is supported by the ﬁnding that the pos-
itive eﬀect of a “young society” on the perceived security of property rights
is weaker if political participation is restricted.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 oﬀers a brief liter-
ature review and identiﬁes various factors that possibly aﬀect the security of
property rights in developing countries. In addition it discusses the potential
role of countries’ demographic structure. In Section 3 we introduce the em-
pirical model as well as our data set. In Section 4 we present and discuss the
results for diﬀerent subsamples and speciﬁcations. Section 5 summarizes and
5concludes. Variable descriptions and sources can be found in the appendix.
2 Distributional conﬂict and the security of
property rights: theory
2.1 “Outright” and “creeping” expropriation
The most blatant form of infringing on foreign investors’ property rights is
outright (or“direct”) expropriation, which Kobrin (1984) deﬁnes as ”the invol-
untary forced divestment of foreign direct investment”. It explicitely includes
the takeover of foreign ownership, either through (a) formal nationalizations
by the executive, (b) extra-legal expropriation of foreign property, (c) forced
sales of foreign equity and (d) forced contract renegotiation. While outright
expropriation has become rather rare in recent decades (Minor 1994; Haj-
zler 2008), foreign investors’ property rights are still jeopardized by various
forms of “creeping” (or “indirect”) expropriation, which includes restrictions
on the repatriation of returns, but also discriminatory taxation and a deliber-
ate tolerance towards corruption. We argue that both outright and creeping
expropriation can be traced back to policymakers’ decisions which, in turn,
depend on the costs and beneﬁts of a more or less hostile policy towards
foreign ﬁrms.
2.2 Expropriation: Costs and beneﬁts
In this subsection we review the theoretical literature on the forces that
inﬂuence the security of property rights in developing countries and emerging
markets. Much of this literature focuses on the risk of outright expropriation.
However, the insights gained by this line of research can also be used to
understand the various forms of creeping expropriation – i.e. more subtle
ways through which the government appropriates and/or redistributes foreign
investors’ revenues and assets.
When deciding on the expropriation of foreign investors, a government
weighs the costs and beneﬁts arising from such a decision. In the short run,
beneﬁts from expropriation stem from the takeover of foreign property, and
the refusal of any outstanding payments to the investor. In the long run,
additional beneﬁts may arise from spillovers and knowledge transfers from
foreign enterprises to domestic producers (Tomz and Wright 2008). Costs
of expropriation may result from the fact that some intangible factors of
production like managerial skills cannot be replaced. In this case the host
country uses foreign ﬁrms’ capital stock for production, but the returns are
6likely to be lower than the returns which would have been achieved with
the technological know-how of foreign investors (Eaton and Gersovitz 1984;
Harms and an de Meulen 2009). Finally, as argued in Cole and English (1991)
and Thomas and Worrall (1994), Aguiar et al. (2009) as well as Aguiar and
Amador (2009), expropriating countries may suﬀer from a serious reduction of
capital inﬂows in the future, e.g. because expropriation triggers an embargo
by international investors.
2.3 The role of demographic structure
It is unlikely that the costs and beneﬁts mentioned in the previous subsec-
tion aﬀect all members of a society in a symmetric fashion or that there
is a transfer mechanism through which the beneﬁciaries from expropriation
compensate the losers. Hence, it is of crucial importance to determine which
diﬀerences between members of a host-country population may give rise to
conﬂicting attitudes towards foreign investors. In this paper, we argue that
demographic structure is an important (albeit not the only) source of hetero-
geneity: members of diﬀerent age groups diﬀer with respect to their income
sources (labor or capital), their productivity levels, their human capital en-
dowments, as well as their time horizons. These diﬀerences are likely to
expose them in a diﬀerent way to the costs and beneﬁts associated with
expropriation.
As argued above, a deteriorating business climate is likely to result in the
withdrawal of foreign expertise and a drop in productivity – at least in those
ﬁrms that were previously operated by foreign managers. The lower pro-
ductivity reduces the incomes of workers who are employed by multinational
enterprises and – depending on the degree of intersectoral labor mobility –
potentially the overall wage level in the economy. Since foreign ﬁrms usually
pay higher wages to skilled labor (Martins 2004; G¨ org and Figini 2006; G¨ org
and Girma 2007; G¨ org et al. 2007; Fosfuri et al. 2001; G¨ org and Geishecker
2008), this eﬀect is especially strong for workers with a higher level of edu-
cation. Conversely, while shareholders of foreign ﬁrms are hurt, the reduced
competitive pressure is likely to raise the proﬁts of domestic ﬁrms – and thus
their owners’ incomes. Finally, individuals with a short time-horizon suﬀer
less from the long-term costs of expropriation, arising e.g. from investment
embargoes or reduced domestic capital accumulation (Li 2009; Harms and
an de Meulen 2009; Minor 1994).
How these eﬀects shape the distributional interests of diﬀerent generations
crucially depends on the relative importance of wages and capital incomes
along agents’ life cycle. Moreover, the stake of domestic capital owners is
determined by the extent to which they hold shares in foreign ﬁrms. These
7patterns depend on the level of ﬁnancial development, the structure of the
educational system, the skill level of the work force etc.. We should therefore
expect the eﬀect of demographic variables to diﬀer between countries that
are at diﬀerent stages of development.
2.4 The role of the political regime
In the preceding subsection we have discussed how the attitude towards multi-
national ﬁrms may vary across age groups. However, whether and how con-
ﬂicting interests aﬀect a government’s decision crucially depends on a coun-
try’s political institutions: on the one hand, it can be argued that democratic
governments are less likely to expropriate since the constraints on the exec-
utive prevent actions that do not beneﬁt the population (Li and Resnick
2003; Stasavage 2002; Li 2009; Jensen 2003; Jensen 2008). On the other
hand, however, democratic institutions may raise the risk of expropriation if
the popular mood turns against foreign ﬁrms (Wells 1998). Moreover, since
democratic incumbents usually have a shorter expected tenure the execu-
tive is more amenable to popular pressure as the beneﬁts from expropriation
accrue immediately whereas most of the costs take longer to materialize.4
Hence, we conjecture that political institutions have an inﬂuence on the se-
curity of property rights, even if we don’t have a clear hypothesis on the
direction of this eﬀect. In addition to this direct inﬂuence, the characteris-
tics of the political system may also have an indirect eﬀect on the security of
property rights: since the extent of political participation deﬁnes the chan-
nel through which heterogenous interests aﬀect policy decisions, and since
more democratic regimes supposedly give a greater weight to the more nu-
merous groups in society, the political regime is likely to inﬂuence the eﬀect
of demographic structure on the perceived risk of expropriation.
3 Demographic structure and the security of
property rights: An empirical investigation
3.1 Speciﬁcation and data
Our sample consists of data for 68 developing countries and emerging markets
for the years 1984 to 2005. Our focus on this time span is determined by
the availability of our dependent variable, the International Country Risk
4Indeed, Li (2009) shows that leadership turnover increases the number of expropria-
tions.
8Guide’s “Investment Proﬁle” measure. When annual data were available we
computed ﬁve-year averages (1986-90, 1991-95, 1996-2000, 2001-05), while
the initial period (1984-85) covers only two years.
Note that the Investment Proﬁle index reﬂects the likelihood of expropri-
ation as perceived by international investors. Our choice of this indicator is
motivated by the following considerations: ﬁrst and foremost, this variable
reﬂects the risk of both outright and creeping expropriation. Moreover, the
fact that actual expropriations are rather rare does not imply that interna-
tional investors are not concerned about the security of property rights. In
fact, the upshot of most theoretical studies is that the volume and composi-
tion of capital inﬂows is chosen to prevent expropriation in equilibrium (see,
e.g., Cole and English 1991, Thomas and Worrall 1994, Aguiar et al. 2009,
Harms and an de Meulen 2009). The investment proﬁle index accounts for
this situation by reﬂecting agents’ perceptions on the security of property
rights.
The decision to use a quinquennial data set is motivated by data availabil-
ity – in particular, demographic data and data on human capital endowments
are available only every ﬁve years – but also by the notion that the link be-
tween countries’ demographic structure and the security of property rights
involves long-term processes which are hard to detect in annual data.
Our results are based on estimating variants of the following regression
equation:
iprofileit = β0 + β1 ·Demographit +
k 
j=2
βj · xj,it + ξt +  it. (1)
In equation (1), iprofile is the International Country Risk Guide’s
“Investment Proﬁle” index as described in the introduction, which captures
the perceived likelihood of expropriation. The variable demograph is
some measure of demographic structure. The subscript i denotes the country
while t refers to the time period. We will start by estimating equation (1) by
pooled OLS. In a second step we will introduce ﬁxed eﬀects that account for
unobserved heterogeneity. The calculation of standard errors will be based on
a robust covariance matrix of the error term, controlling for heteroscedasticity
and serial correlation of errors at the country-level. Sources and summary
statistics for all variables are shown in the appendix.
3.2 Regressors
Our main goal is to determine how countries’ demographic structure (demo-
graph) inﬂuences the perceived security of property rights as reﬂected by
9iprofile. Based on the discussion in Section 2 we ﬁrst operationalize de-
mograph by using the ratio of young workers (aged 15-39) to old workers
(aged 40-64) computed on the basis of data from the United Nations Popula-
tion Division (2008). This variable (yworkers) reﬂects the relative size
of two politically relevant age groups with potentially conﬂicting attitudes
towards foreign investors.5 Since observations are available every ﬁve years,
we relate the value of iprofile for 1984-85, 1986-90 etc. to the ”initial”
value of yworkers in 1980, 1985 etc. Note that this helps us to mit-
igate potential endogeneity problems arising from an (admittedly unlikely)
reverse inﬂuence of iprofile on yworkers. To isolate the impact of a
country’s demographic structure ceteris paribus, we control for other factors
which possibly inﬂuence the security of property rights and which are poten-
tially correlated with yworkers. Two obvious candidates are countries’
per-capita income level and their stock of human capital. While it is plausi-
ble that a country’s per-capita income inﬂuences the risk of expropriation, it
is not obvious ex ante whether this eﬀect is positive or negative: on the one
hand, poverty is usually a source of popular discontent which may eventually
turn against foreign investors. On the other hand, however, Picht and St¨ uven
(1991) and Tomz and Wright (2008) argue that expropriations are more likely
to occur when economic conditions are favorable, foreign ﬁrms’ proﬁts are
high, and the welfare losses associated with foreign sanctions are perceived
as being low. We therefore include countries’ real per-capita income without
a clear hypothesis on the sign of this eﬀect.6 To mitigate the obvious en-
dogeneity problem – i.e. the fact that insecure property rights are harmful
for macroeconomic performance7 – we lag the natural logarithm of countries’
real per-capita income as reported in the Penn World Table by one period
(income(-1)). A country’s stock of human capital is likely to matter since
– as we argued in Section 2 – skilled workers reap higher beneﬁts from the
presence of multinational ﬁrms. To account for this eﬀect, we use the variable
schooling which is taken from Barro and Lee (2001) and which measures
the average number of years of school attendance of individuals aged above 25
years. As with the demographic data, observations on school attendance are
only available every ﬁfth year, and we relate the values from 1980, 1985 etc.
to subsequent ﬁve-year averages. We expect this variable to have a positive
5As we will show later, replacing yworkers by alternative measures of demo-
graphic structure, e.g. the young-age dependency ratio, does not alter our qualitative
results.
6In fact, Jodice (1980) and Li (2009) ﬁnd the eﬀect of economic prosperity on the
likelihood of expropriation to be curvilinear.
7See Hall and Jones (1999), Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi (2004), Easterly and
Levine (2003) and Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001).
10inﬂuence on iprofile.L i k et h elevel of a country’s per-capita income, the
growth rate of real GDP per capita may both positively and negatively aﬀect
the security of property rights: on the one hand, multinational ﬁrms may be
scapegoated in times of crises (Picht and St¨ uven 1991). On the other hand,
however, high growth may render the expropriation of foreign assets more
attractive (Tomz and Wright 2008). Again, there is an obvious endogene-
ity problem, and we therefore use the average growth rate of real per-capita
GDP in the preceding ﬁve-year period (growth(-1)). To capture the no-
tion that macroeconomic instability generates social tensions that aﬀect the
risk of expropriation, we use the average inﬂation rate (infla) as a further
regressor. Since some observations in our sample are extremely high, we take
the logarithm of the CPI-inﬂation rate, as reported by World Bank (2009)
and expect this variable to have a negative inﬂuence on iprofile.W ea l s o
include a measure of trade openness – the sum of exports and imports rela-
tive to GDP – to account for the idea that more open economies are more
vulnerable to foreign sanctions. Since drops in investor conﬁdence are often
associated with a reduction of international trade (Rose 2005), we use the
lagged value (Openness(-1)) as a regressor, and we expect this variable
to have a positive eﬀect on the perceived security of property rights.
In Section 2, we argued that political institutions may have an inﬂuence
on the security of property rights. However, the eﬀect may go both ways: on
the one hand, lower accountability makes it likely that the government ex-
propriates foreign ﬁrms to cater to particular interests against the will of the
general population. On the other hand, however, democratic governments
have a shorter time horizon and may therefore be more amenable to populist
pressures. To account for the political regime, we use the “Political Rights”
index compiled by Freedom House (2009). This variable measures (a) the
degree of freedom in the electoral process, (b) the amount of party pluralism
and the right of political participation and (c) the functioning of the gov-
ernment. We denote this variable by polrepress.8 Later in the paper
we will use alternative“democracy indicators”to test whether our results are
sensitive to our particular choice of the Freedom House index.
Finally, we control for two aspects of the political and institutional en-
vironment, which are likely to inﬂuence the security of property rights: ”Gov-
ernment Stability”(govstab) and ”Law and Order”(laworder),w h i c h
we take from Political Risk Services Group (2008).9 We believe that greater
8Note that Freedom House uses a scale between 1 and 7 points to rate political rights,
with a lower score reﬂecting a higher degree of political freedom. Hence, the original
Freedom House indicator is essentially a measure of political repression.
9Government Stability measures ”the government’s ability to carry out its declared
program(s) and its ability to stay in oﬃce” (Political Risk Services Group 2008). It is
11government stability positively aﬀects the security of property rights since it
implicitly lengthens the time horizon of the executive. Conversely, ”Law and
Order” measures the strength of the judiciary to control executive leaders.
If a country’s courts are unable or unwilling to enforce existing laws, multi-
national ﬁrms are more exposed to all sorts of creeping expropriation, and
this should drag down the “Investment Proﬁle” index. We therefore expect
positive coeﬃcients for both govstab and laworder.
In addition to the time-variant regressors used so far, we include several
“ﬁxed factors”which potentially aﬀect the risk of expropriation. First, we use
the dummy variable oil which takes on the value ”1”whenever an economy
belongs to the group of oil-exporting countries.10 Historically, ﬁrms in re-
source extraction sectors were exceptionally often aﬀected by expropriation.
There are (at least) two potential explanations: ﬁrst, resource extraction is
highly capital-intensive, and the wage losses in case of expropriation are usu-
ally low. Moreover, oil-exporting countries are in a better bargaining position
since the reliance on their oil supply makes harsh sanctions less likely. Hence
we should expect oil to have a negative sign.
Basically the same arguments hold for a second resource-related vari-
able, rawmat, which is the dummy variable ”Exporter of non-fuel primary
products” of the World Bank (1995). We also include the variable lati-
tude which measures a country’s distance from the equator. This variable
is meant to capture unobserved institutional properties which are not explic-
itly reﬂected by other variables in our regression. Although we expect the
coeﬃcient of latitude to be positive, the eﬀect might attenuate or even
vanish as we control for numerous institutional and economic variables that
are correlated with latitude. Finally, we control for other regional- and
time-speciﬁc features by using a set of regional dummy variables as well as
time dummies for every ﬁve-year period.
4 Results
In this section we present the results of estimating equation (1). We start by
estimating a linear speciﬁcation using OLS with and without ﬁxed eﬀects.
Later we allow for nonlinear eﬀects, include alternative proxies for countries’
demographic structure and political regime, and use the ordered probit and
calculated as the sum of three subcomponents, namely Government Unity, Legislative
Strength and Popular Support.
10In determining the sample of oil-exporting countries we refer to Morsy (2009), as
Morsy’s assessment refers to a time span (1970-2006) that is very close to the one used in
our study.
12ordered logit estimators to account for the ordinal nature of the dependent
variable. In Section 2, we argued that the eﬀect of demographic structure
might depend on the level of development: low- and middle-income countries
are characterized by a particular set of economic and social institutions, and
these are likely to shape the channels through which demographic structure
aﬀects the security of property rights. We therefore run our regression both
for the complete sample and for subsamples that only include middle income
countries (MIC) or low income countries (LIC).11
4.1 Benchmark regressions
The estimation results based on our benchmark equation (1) are presented in
Table 1. Columns 1-3 give the results of estimating equation (1) by OLS for
diﬀerent samples, while columns 4-6 document the eﬀect of including ﬁxed
eﬀects.
Turning ﬁrst to the control variables, the coeﬃcients for infla and
govstab have the expected sign, are highly signiﬁcant, and the qualitative
impact is fairly stable across subsamples and estimation methods: inﬂation,
being a symptom of macroeconomic instability, raises the perceived risk of
expropriation, while government stability improves a country’s Investment
Proﬁle index. The eﬀect of growth(-1) is signiﬁcantly positive in most
columns, while income(-1) does not seem to have a positive impact. We
checked whether this reﬂected the possibility highlighted by Li (2009) and
Jodice (1980) that economic prosperity has a nonlinear inﬂuence on the secu-
rity of property rights. However, when we included both income(-1) and
squared income(-1) , neither the former nor the latter variable turned
out to be signiﬁcant. The coeﬃcients of laworder, schooling and
openness(-1) do not deliver a clear picture: while laworder has the
expected sign for the LIC sample, its coeﬃcient is mostly insigniﬁcant for
the other samples. The average level of education, as reﬂected by school-
ing, has a signiﬁcantly positive eﬀect for most samples – but only if we omit
ﬁxed eﬀects. Finally, openness(-1) fails to be signiﬁcant for any sample
and speciﬁcation. The signiﬁcantly negative coeﬃcients of polrepress
for all samples and speciﬁcations suggests that, ceteris paribus, there is a
higher likelihood of expropriation in non-democratic countries. Apparently,
the limited accountability of autocratic rulers is perceived as a greater threat
than democratic governments’ temptation to cater to redistributive interests.
11The classiﬁcation is based on countries’ GNI per capita, using the World Bank’s Atlas
method (World Bank 2009). Note that we account for the fact that some countries moved
from one income group to another over time (World Bank 2008).
13Our main interest lies in the impact of countries’ demographic structure,
as reﬂected by the age-composition of the working-age population (ywor-
kers), on the security of property rights. While the coeﬃcient of ywork-
ers reported in Table 1 is positive but insigniﬁcant for the complete sample,
it is signiﬁcantly positive for the LIC subsample. Once we move from OLS
to ﬁxed-eﬀects estimation, the coeﬃcient becomes signiﬁcantly negative for
the entire sample, but insigniﬁcant for the LIC and MIC subsamples. These
results conﬁrm our conjecture that the inﬂuence of demographic structure dif-
fers across income groups: in the more prosperous emerging markets, there is
a middle class which has access to formal capital markets, and ﬁnancial sta-
bility is crucial to protect old individuals’ savings. At the same time, young
individuals spend more time on education, and enter work life at a later date.
Hence, a larger share of ”young workers” has not yet entered work life and
is therefore less aﬀected by the negative wage eﬀects of expropriation. Both
properties are likely to contribute to the negative sign of yworkers in the
total and MIC sample. The stakes of diﬀerent generations change once we
focus on low-income countries where informal modes of wealth accumulation
prevail and where young individuals are much more exposed to the negative
eﬀects of expropriation.
4.2 Nonlinear eﬀects
The result in Table 1 indicates that greater political repression reduces the
security of property rights. In addition to this direct eﬀect, the extent of
political participation determines how conﬂicting distributional interests in-
ﬂuence the government’s decisions: if a large young generation strongly sup-
ports outright or creeping expropriation, this attitude is more likely to turn
into an expropriation decision if citizens participate in the selection of their
leaders and if the government’s decision reﬂects the interests of the majority.
Based on these considerations, we introduce the regressor ywork-
ers · polrepress which interacts the composition of the labor force
(yworkers) with the Freedom House indicator of political repression
(polrepress). If young individuals support expropriation more strongly
than the old generation, the coeﬃcient of this interactive term should be pos-
itive – indicating that the impact of demographic structure is muted in less
democratic regimes. Conversely, if young individuals oppose expropriation,
the coeﬃcient of the interactive term should be negative.
The results in Table 2 once more conﬁrm the notion that the role of de-
mographic structure strongly diﬀers across income groups: whereas a higher
portion of young workers has a negative (though mostly insigniﬁcant) inﬂu-
ence on the security of property rights in the total and the MIC sample, the
14sign is reversed when we focus on low-income countries. The impact of the
interactive term is signiﬁcantly negative in the LIC sample, suggesting that
the young generation’s opposition against expropriation is less inﬂuential in
non-democratic political institutions. Evaluated at the low-income sample
mean of polrepress, the marginal eﬀect of yworkers is not signif-
icantly diﬀerent from zero, a ﬁnding that was foreshadowed by the result
in column (6) of Table 1. However, as polrepress decreases, i.e. the
political system becomes more democratic, having a larger share of young
workers positively aﬀects the perceived security of property rights. Con-
versely, young agents are more hostile towards foreign ﬁrms in middle-income
countries which dominate in the full sample, but their preference for expropri-
ation is less regarded in non-democratic regimes. Note, however, that there
are more than 30 LIC observations for which polrepress is greater than
5.963, the value at which the marginal eﬀect of yworkers turns negative
in the LIC subsample. In these cases enlarging the share of young to old work-
ers exacerbates the risk of expropriation. The interpretation we oﬀer focuses
on the inﬂuence of expropriation on factor prices: a large group of young
workers reduces the capital-labor ratio and is likely to raise foreign ﬁrms’
proﬁts. The resulting incentive to expropriate foreign ﬁrms is unchecked if
an autocratic government does not account for the young generation’s resis-
tance against expropriation. This may explain the negative marginal eﬀect
of yworkers on iprofile for very high values of polrepress.
Interestingly, with ﬁxed eﬀects estimation the coeﬃcient of polre-
press is signiﬁcantly positive for the LIC sample once we include the in-
teractive term. However, evaluated at the sample mean of yworkers
the marginal eﬀect of polrepress is signiﬁcantly negative, suggesting
that less political repression still improves the perceived security of property
rights.
4.3 Alternative proxies for demographic structure and
political institutions
So far, we have used the ratio of young workers over old workers (yworkers)
as a proxy for countries’ demographic structure, and the Freedom House in-
dex of political rights to measure the extent of political participation. We
have argued thatyworkers was well-suited to reﬂect the relative strength
of interest groups with potentially conﬂicting interests, and that the “Free-
dom House index”accounted for the question whether speciﬁc distributional
interests aﬀected the government’s expropriation decision. There are, how-
ever, alternative proxies that reﬂect countries’ demographic structure and
15political regime, and in this section we check whether our previous results
are robust with respect to using these alternative variables. In doing so,
we stick to the ﬁxed-eﬀects speciﬁcation and include the interactive term
discussed in the previous section.
We start by replacing (yworkers) by a ratio that divides the popu-
lation aged 0-40 years by the population aged over 40 years (under40) -
i.e. we abandon our focus on the labor force and include both children (as
part of the“young generation”) and retired persons (as part of the“old gen-
eration”). The ﬁrst three columns in Table 3 demonstrate that this variation
does not alter our key results. In particular, a higher share of the young
generation improves the perceived security of property rights in low-income
countries if the political regime is suﬃciently democratic. Again, the results
of the MIC and the full sample point in another direction: in the full sam-
ple the variable under40 has a negative marginal eﬀect on the perceived
security of property rights. The signiﬁcantly positive coeﬃcient of the inter-
action term indicates that this eﬀect is mitigated if the political system is
less democratic. This supports the notion that the distributional interests of
young agents substantially diﬀer across countries at diﬀerent income levels,
and that the political regime determines how strongly their attitude towards
international ﬁrms aﬀects government policy.
Columns 4 to 6 in Table 3 show the results of using the young-age depen-
dency ratio (ydepratio) instead of yworkers. In all subsamples, the
marginal eﬀect of ydepratio is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. How-
ever, the interactive term with polrepress has a signiﬁcantly negative
coeﬃcient in the LIC sample, indicating that the stabilizing eﬀect of yde-
pratio is dampened in less democratic countries. The signs are reversed in
the full sample and the MIC subsample, with a higher value of ydepratio
having a negative aﬀect which is dampened by greater political repression.
In columns 7 to 9 we return to using yworkers as a measure of de-
mographic structure, but replace the Freedom House index of political re-
pression by the variable polityii which is taken from the Polity IV project
and which measures a country’s level of democratization (Marshall and Jag-
gers 2007). This variable is deﬁned on the interval [-10, 10] with higher
values reﬂecting a more democratic political regime. Note that in compari-
son to polrepress, polityii is a broader measure, reﬂecting more than
just the possibility to participate in the political process, but also covering
the separation of powers and the degree of civil liberties beyond the elec-
toral process. In accordance with our previous results, we should expect
a positive coeﬃcient of the interactive term yworkers · polityii in
the low-income country subsample. This is in fact what we get: while the
separate coeﬃcient of yworkers is no longer signiﬁcant for low-income
16countries, the interactive term has a signiﬁcantly positive eﬀect indicating
that countries with a younger work force exhibit a lower risk of expropriation
– provided that the political process is suﬃciently democratic. Again, the
opposite ﬁnding emerges for the full sample and the MIC subsample where
the marginal eﬀect of yworkers is negative.
The results presented in Table 3 thus suggest that our key ﬁnding is not
an artifact of using a particular proxy for countries’ demographic structure
or political regime: quite robustly, it turns out that a larger share of“young
people” – be it young workers or young workers and their children – have
a negative or negligible eﬀect on the security of property rights in middle-
income countries. In low-income countries, by contrast, the young generation
potentially reduces the risk of expropriation. However, whether this eﬀect
actually materializes crucially depends on the political regime: if agents have
no possibility to participate in the political process, the stabilizing inﬂuence
of the young generation is muted or even reversed.
4.4 Ordered probit and logit
The ”Investment Proﬁle”index, which serves as the dependent variable in our
estimations is a subjective and qualitative measure denoting the perceived
degree of the security of property rights using an ordinal 12 points scale.
Ignoring the non-cardinal nature of our dependent variable might bias our
results, and we therefore estimated equation (1) using the ordered probit and
logit estimators. To limit the number of threshold values to be estimated
we divide the Investment Proﬁle index into four categories. The resulting
variable Quartiled iprofile takes the value 1 for 1 ≤ iprofile < 4,
the value 2 for 4 ≤ iprofile < 7, etc. As in the preceding estimations, the
calculation of standard errors is based on a cluster-robust covariance matrix
of the error terms. Furthermore, we run regressions for the complete sample
and for subsamples of middle income or low income countries.
Moreover we allow for nonlinear eﬀects by including a regressor that in-
teracts yworkers and polrepress. In Table 4 the results for the
ordered probit estimator are presented in columns 1-3, while the ﬁndings
for the ordered logit estimator are shown in columns 4-6. Not surprisingly,
the results are quite similar. Moreover, they support the insights we de-
rived from OLS estimation.12 Countries’ economic growth and price level
stability as well as institutional quality, e.g. high levels of govstab and
12Note however, that, with ordered probit/logit, the mapping of coeﬃcients into
marginal eﬀects is not trivial since the latter depends on how much mass of the distribution
is shifted between the diﬀerent threshold values.
17laworder spur the security of property rights – at least in the LIC sam-
ple. Most importantly, the ﬁndings on the eﬀect of yworkers mirror
results from OLS regressions: while demographic structure does not aﬀect
the perceived risk of expropriation in the full sample and the MIC subsample,
a higher share of young workers raises iprofile in low-income countries
if the political system is suﬃciently democratic. By contrast, the eﬀect of
yworkers is negative if young workers’ opposition against expropriation
does not suﬃciently inﬂuence the government’s decision.
5C o n c l u s i o n s
While there is little disagreement that low institutional quality is an imped-
iment to international capital ﬂows, there are only few contributions which
identify the empirical determinants of institutional quality in general and the
security of property rights in particular.
In this paper we have focused on the role of demographic structure.
Speciﬁcally we wanted to know whether a high population share of young
agents which is often identiﬁed as a potential driver for North-South capital
ﬂows, is, at the same time, deterring foreign investors by raising the risk of
creeping or outright expropriation. It turned out that, at least in low income
countries, this is not the case. Once we control for other factors aﬀecting
the security of property rights, a higher share of young agents reduces the
perceived likelihood of expropriation provided that the country is suﬃciently
democratic and grants its citizens the right of political participation. This
result does not hinge on the choice of particular proxies for a country’s de-
mographic structure or political regime.
We argue that this ﬁnding is driven by the heterogenous attitudes of dif-
ferent generations towards foreign ﬁrms which, in turn, result from the impact
of expropriation – be it outright or creeping – on factor prices and agents’
incomes: due to the greater importance of wages in their income and their
longer time horizons, young agents’ interests are likely to be aligned with
those of foreign investors. While this conjecture is not generally conﬁrmed,
it emerges quite strongly for the low-income subsample: in these countries,
an increase of the number of young workers relative to old workers reduces
the perceived risk of expropriation, provided that the political system is suf-
ﬁciently democratic. By contrast, a higher share of young agents tends to
reduce the security of property rights in middle-income countries, and this
eﬀect is exacerbated by democratic institutions.
Our ﬁndings answer the original question on the role of demographic
structure for the security of property rights. Moreover, they suggest that a
18potential remedy to high expropriation risk in low-income countries would be
to empower the young generation with the right to articulate their political
preferences. However, our results also raise a number of additional issues.
In particular, we need to explain why the role of young agents diﬀers so
much across income groups: why do young workers take sides with foreign
investors in low-income countries while this relationship cannot be observed
(or is even reversed) in middle income countries? We conjecture that this is
due to the time path of earnings along the life-cycle. In low-income countries,
individuals enter the labor force at an earlier age and are less reliant on stable
ﬁnancial markets at old age. By contrast, in more developed countries young
persons are less exposed to the detrimental wage eﬀects of expropriation
since they usually enter work life at a relatively late age. In addition, the old
generation in relatively rich countries is less likely to welcome expropriation
since its members have possibly invested a share of their wealth in foreign
ﬁrms and since expropriation reduces their incomes by resulting in large-scale
ﬁnancial sector turmoil. To explore whether these conjectures are actually
supported by the facts is an exciting subject for further research.
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23AT a b l e s
Benchmark Speciﬁcation
OLS Fixed Eﬀects
Full Sample MIC LIC Full Sample MIC LIC
yworkers 0.023 −0.026 0.649∗∗ −1.309∗∗ −0.717 0.664
[0.255] [0.274] [0.313] [0.528] [0.764] [1.016]
growth(-1) 0.116∗∗∗ 0.111∗∗∗ 0.059 0.080∗∗∗ 0.088∗∗∗ 0.044
[0.027] [0.031] [0.041] [0.028] [0.029] [0.039]
income(-1) −0.001 0.198 −0.930∗∗ −0.651 −0.825 −0.104
[0.217] [0.229] [0.399] [0.558] [0.622] [0.841]
laworder −0.056 −0.188∗ 0.438∗∗∗ 0.047 −0.142 0.469∗
[0.088] [0.094] [0.136] [0.144] [0.185] [0.255]
infla −0.347∗∗∗ −0.372∗∗∗ −0.338∗∗∗ −0.355∗∗∗ −0.327∗∗ −0.427∗∗∗
[0.100] [0.134] [0.112] [0.113] [0.155] [0.129]
polrepress −0.234∗∗∗ −0.255∗∗∗ −0.255∗∗∗ −0.247∗∗∗ −0.292∗∗∗ −0.255∗∗
[0.060] [0.071] [0.052] [0.073] [0.093] [0.103]
govstab 0.456∗∗∗ 0.528∗∗∗ 0.448∗∗∗ 0.410∗∗∗ 0.594∗∗∗ 0.393∗∗∗
[0.055] [0.060] [0.064] [0.072] [0.070] [0.093]
schooling 0.157∗∗∗ −0.004 0.185∗ 0.106 −0.233 −0.034
[0.057] [0.070] [0.095] [0.183] [0.187] [0.514]
openness(-1) −0.073 −0.059 0.450 −0.032 −0.615 −0.510
[0.274] [0.314] [0.397] [0.639] [0.664] [1.280]
oil −0.147 −0.107 0.103
[0.258] [0.259] [0.276]
latitude −0.000 0.000 −0.001∗∗∗
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
rawmat 0.350 0.237 0.262
[0.213] [0.278] [0.223]
east asia & pacific −1.358 −1.004
[0.877] [1.000]
europe & central asia −0.061 0.146
[0.696] [0.776]
middle east & north africa −0.867 −0.873
[0.797] [0.830]
south asia −1.310 −0.555 0.091
[0.838] [1.054] [0.447]
sub saharan africa −0.610 −0.289 −0.696
[0.889] [0.915] [0.590]
latin america & the caribic −0.941 −0.512 −0.493
[0.869] [0.965] [0.588]
R-squared 0.648 0.671 0.710 0.671 0.725 0.637
Observations 296 213 110 296 213 110
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The dependent variable is iprofile.
The data sample is an unbalanced panel, comprising initial values or ﬁve-year averages (1986-90, 1991-95, 1996-2000,
2001-05), with the initial period (1984-85) covering only two years. All regressions include time dummies; their
coeﬃcients are available upon request. The estimates are based on robust standard errors clustered by country.
Table 1: Benchmark Speciﬁcation: The eﬀect of yworkers oniprofile
using pooled OLS and ﬁxed eﬀects estimationNonlinear Eﬀects
OLS Fixed Eﬀects
Full Sample MIC LIC Full Sample MIC LIC
yworkers −0.080 −0.009 2.552∗∗ −1.681∗∗∗ −0.782 4.349∗∗∗
[0.392] [0.412] [1.112] [0.621] [0.966] [1.226]
yworkers · polrepress 0.032 −0.006 −0.428∗∗ 0.117 0.017 −0.923∗∗∗
[0.111] [0.119] [0.198] [0.094] [0.141] [0.239]
Marginal Eﬀect of yworkers 0.039 −0.029 0.587 −1.247∗∗ −0.726 0.110
[0.274] [0.286] [0.403] [0.530] [0.773] [1.044]
Marginal Eﬀect of polrepress −0.233∗∗∗ −0.255∗∗∗ −0.261∗∗∗ −0.244∗∗∗ −0.290∗∗∗ −0.268∗∗∗
[0.061] [0.072] [0.052] [0.075] [0.104] [0.770]
growth(-1) 0.117∗∗∗ 0.111∗∗∗ 0.055 0.080∗∗∗ 0.088∗∗∗ 0.032
[0.027] [0.031] [0.041] [0.028] [0.029] [0.035]
income(-1) 0.002 0.197 −0.850∗∗ −0.618 −0.823 −0.416
[0.222] [0.233] [0.371] [0.543] [0.616] [0.734]
laworder −0.056 −0.188∗ 0.447∗∗∗ 0.050 −0.141 0.504∗∗
[0.089] [0.094] [0.136] [0.144] [0.185] [0.226]
infla −0.346∗∗∗ −0.372∗∗∗ −0.330∗∗∗ −0.361∗∗∗ −0.328∗∗ −0.339∗∗∗
[0.101] [0.132] [0.110] [0.114] [0.153] [0.119]
polrepress −0.311 −0.241 0.850 −0.526∗∗ −0.329 2.131∗∗∗
[0.260] [0.269] [0.507] [0.220] [0.271] [0.638]
govstab 0.459∗∗∗ 0.528∗∗∗ 0.451∗∗∗ 0.419∗∗∗ 0.595∗∗∗ 0.397∗∗∗
[0.056] [0.060] [0.059] [0.073] [0.075] [0.085]
schooling 0.153∗∗∗ −0.004 0.228∗∗ 0.111 −0.227 0.209
[0.056] [0.068] [0.101] [0.181] [0.211] [0.440]
openness(-1) −0.064 −0.059 0.349 −0.010 −0.614 −0.262
[0.279] [0.316] [0.402] [0.635] [0.663] [0.963]
oil −0.148 −0.106 0.111
[0.258] [0.265] [0.295]
latitude −0.000 0.000 −0.002∗∗∗
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
rawmat 0.347 0.237 0.224
[0.214] [0.277] [0.264]
east asia & pacific −1.292 −1.014
[0.900] [0.993]
europe & central asia −0.003 0.136
[0.688] [0.776]
middle east & north africa −0.838 −0.877
[0.800] [0.831]
south asia −1.251 −0.565 0.520
[0.861] [1.038] [0.513]
sub saharan africa −0.566 −0.295 −0.358
[0.910] [0.924] [0.616]
latin america & the caribic −0.879 −0.522 −0.384
[0.889] [0.960] [0.644]
R-squared 0.647 0.669 0.718 0.671 0.724 0.678
Observations 296 213 110 296 213 110
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The dependent variable is iprofile.
The data sample is an unbalanced panel, comprising initial values or ﬁve-year averages (1986-90, 1991-95, 1996-2000,
2001-05), with the initial period (1984-85) covering only two years. All regressions include time dummies; their
coeﬃcients are available upon request. The estimates are based on robust standard errors clustered by country.
Table 2: Nonlinear Eﬀects: Inclusion of yworkers · polrepress –
pooled OLS and ﬁxed eﬀects estimationOther demographic and political variables
Fixed Eﬀects Fixed Eﬀects Fixed Eﬀects
Full Sample MIC LIC Full Sample MIC LIC Full Sample MIC LIC
under40 −1.142∗∗∗ −0.437 1.835∗∗∗
[0.403] [0.647] [0.593]
under40 · polrepress 0.111∗∗∗ 0.079 −0.452∗∗∗
[0.041] [0.079] [0.107]
Marginal Eﬀect of under40 −0.730∗∗ −0.172 −0.239
[0.328] [0.513] [0.397]
Marginal Eﬀect of polrepress −0.253∗∗∗ −0.273∗∗ −0.266∗∗∗
[0.076] [0.113] [0.078]
polrepress −0.688∗∗∗ −0.563∗∗ 1.783∗∗∗ −0.895∗∗∗ −0.771∗∗∗ 1.111∗∗
[0.175] [0.249] [0.505] [0.218] [0.276] [0.457]
ydepratio −4.979∗∗ −2.524 6.587∗∗
[2.466] [3.351] [2.648]
ydepratio · polrepress 0.960∗∗∗ 0.863∗ −1.710∗∗∗
[0.287] [0.468] [0.569]
Marginal Eﬀect of ydepratio −1.416 0.374 −1.262
[1.850] [2.432] [2.512]
Marginal Eﬀect of polrepress −0.231∗∗∗ −0.216∗ −0.273∗∗∗
[0.081] [0.117] [0.090]
yworkers −1.112∗ −0.577 0.082
[0.634] [0.875] [1.047]
yworkers · polityii −0.018 −0.021 0.243∗∗∗
[0.028] [0.028] [0.063]
polityii 0.078 0.093 −0.577∗∗∗
[0.075] [0.057] [0.165]
Marginal Eﬀect of yworkers −1.157∗ −0.651 0.045
[0.621] [0.880] [1.049]
Marginal Eﬀect of polityii 0.036 0.044 0.055∗∗
[0.026] [0.032] [0.027]
growth(-1) 0.079∗∗∗ 0.087∗∗∗ 0.028 0.080∗∗∗ 0.083∗∗∗ 0.025 0.086∗∗∗ 0.080∗∗∗ 0.046
[0.027] [0.030] [0.032] [0.027] [0.030] [0.034] [0.028] [0.029] [0.037]
income(-1) −0.598 −0.703 −0.382 −0.503 −0.794 −0.153 −0.846 −1.153∗ −0.319
[0.520] [0.641] [0.756] [0.508] [0.678] [0.726] [0.607] [0.684] [0.749]
laworder 0.043 −0.148 0.570∗∗∗ 0.043 −0.066 0.527∗∗ 0.037 −0.176 0.563∗∗
[0.141] [0.180] [0.198] [0.138] [0.192] [0.216] [0.152] [0.196] [0.212]
infla −0.366∗∗∗ −0.338∗∗ −0.345∗∗∗ −0.361∗∗∗ −0.313∗ −0.419∗∗∗ −0.365∗∗∗ −0.347∗∗ −0.361∗∗
[0.119] [0.164] [0.125] [0.121] [0.168] [0.133] [0.123] [0.171] [0.149]
govstab 0.431∗∗∗ 0.597∗∗∗ 0.359∗∗∗ 0.421∗∗∗ 0.577∗∗∗ 0.346∗∗∗ 0.432∗∗∗ 0.653∗∗∗ 0.420∗∗∗
[0.069] [0.074] [0.091] [0.067] [0.076] [0.089] [0.084] [0.078] [0.092]
schooling 0.016 −0.232 0.279 0.015 −0.117 0.207 0.005 −0.267 −0.087
[0.174] [0.222] [0.415] [0.155] [0.202] [0.456] [0.219] [0.232] [0.408]
openness(-1) 0.014 −0.502 −0.307 0.218 −0.537 −0.415 0.190 −0.521 −0.030
[0.577] [0.597] [1.002] [0.550] [0.575] [1.261] [0.708] [0.718] [1.310]
Constant 14.092∗∗∗ 12.954∗∗ −2.212 12.018∗∗∗ 12.777∗∗ −0.243 13.170∗∗∗ 16.793∗∗∗ 4.617
[4.100] [5.385] [7.575] [3.988] [5.862] [6.325] [4.769] [5.653] [7.745]
R-squared 0.676 0.724 0.687 0.676 0.729 0.662 0.647 0.704 0.649
Observations 296 213 110 296 213 110 296 214 107
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The dependent variable is iprofile. The data sample is an
unbalanced panel, comprising initial values or ﬁve-year averages (1986-90, 1991-95, 1996-2000, 2001-05), with the initial period (1984-85) covering
only two years. All regressions include regional and time dummies; their coeﬃcients are available upon request. The estimates are based on robust
standard errors clustered by country.
Table 3: Other demographic and political variables: Substituting ywork-
ers by under40 and ydepratio and polrepress by polityii
and including the corresponding interactive terms using ﬁxed eﬀects estima-
tionNonlinear Eﬀects
Ordered Probit Ordered Logit
Full Sample MIC LIC Full Sample MIC LIC
yworkers 0.195 0.216 6.071∗∗∗ 0.295 0.245 11.234∗∗∗
[0.426] [0.416] [1.720] [0.794] [0.765] [3.581]
yworkers · polrepress −0.048 −0.091 −1.255∗∗∗ −0.056 −0.089 −2.296∗∗∗
[0.114] [0.123] [0.330] [0.214] [0.250] [0.660]
growth(-1) 0.128∗∗∗ 0.141∗∗∗ 0.211∗∗ 0.248∗∗∗ 0.276∗∗∗ 0.406∗
[0.036] [0.042] [0.087] [0.071] [0.086] [0.215]
income(-1) −0.075 −0.073 −0.625 0.004 −0.016 −1.211
[0.196] [0.262] [0.553] [0.362] [0.552] [1.030]
laworder −0.042 −0.243∗∗ 0.976∗∗∗ −0.114 −0.467∗∗ 1.888∗∗∗
[0.105] [0.113] [0.279] [0.206] [0.220] [0.724]
infla −0.340∗∗∗ −0.450∗∗∗ −0.480∗∗ −0.615∗∗∗ −0.851∗∗ −1.041∗∗
[0.119] [0.173] [0.206] [0.225] [0.350] [0.525]
polrepress −0.166 −0.144 2.796∗∗∗ −0.372 −0.454 5.085∗∗∗
[0.272] [0.273] [0.784] [0.516] [0.544] [1.532]
govstab 0.414∗∗∗ 0.597∗∗∗ 0.602∗∗∗ 0.786∗∗∗ 1.149∗∗∗ 1.189∗∗∗
[0.096] [0.110] [0.147] [0.199] [0.232] [0.373]
schooling 0.079 −0.065 0.217∗∗ 0.127 −0.113 0.302
[0.064] [0.083] [0.109] [0.120] [0.162] [0.221]
openness(-1) 0.153 0.022 1.802∗∗∗ 0.351 −0.042 3.168∗∗∗
[0.336] [0.405] [0.642] [0.607] [0.754] [1.161]
oil 0.126 0.251 1.007∗∗ 0.108 0.363 2.016∗∗
[0.217] [0.248] [0.401] [0.397] [0.483] [0.864]
latitude −0.000 0.000 −0.002∗∗ 0.000 0.001 −0.004∗∗
[0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002]
rawmat 0.257 0.090 0.358 0.464 0.355 0.811
[0.245] [0.363] [0.384] [0.466] [0.742] [0.798]
east asia & pacific −1.469∗ −0.889 −0.717 −2.425 −1.219 −0.985
[0.877] [0.967] [0.828] [1.663] [1.815] [1.445]
europe & central asia 0.011 0.458 0.315 1.263
[0.539] [0.684] [1.021] [1.314]
middle east & north africa −1.106∗ −0.881 −1.821 −1.321
[0.632] [0.698] [1.138] [1.208]
south asia −1.482∗∗ 0.438 1.090∗ −2.411∗ 1.281 2.294∗
[0.748] [1.035] [0.653] [1.428] [1.960] [1.321]
sub saharan africa −0.846 −0.239 −1.090 0.097
[0.833] [0.847] [1.600] [1.521]
latin america & the caribic −0.859 −0.101 0.278 −1.301 0.209 0.970
[0.853] [0.908] [0.680] [1.657] [1.678] [1.360]
cut1
Constant −1.960 −2.037 12.644∗∗ −2.293 −2.514 22.759∗
[1.901] [2.399] [6.229] [3.506] [4.767] [12.131]
cut2
Constant 1.456 1.715 17.437∗∗∗ 4.076 4.497 31.863∗∗
[1.921] [2.414] [6.282] [3.552] [4.852] [12.702]
cut3
Constant 4.184∗∗ 4.534∗ 9.030∗∗ 9.670∗
[1.982] [2.551] [3.701] [5.205]
R-squared
Observations 296 213 110 296 213 110
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The dependent variable is quartiled
iprofile. The data sample is an unbalanced panel, comprising initial values or ﬁve-year averages (1986-90, 1991-95,
1996-2000, 2001-05), with the initial period (1984-85) covering only two years. All regressions include time dummies;
their coeﬃcients are available upon request. The estimates are based on robust standard errors clustered by country.
Table 4: Nonlinear Eﬀects: Inclusion of yworkers · polrepress
using Ordered Logit and Ordered Probit estimationB Summary Statistics
Overall Between-country No. of
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Std. Dev. Observations
iprofile 6.594646 2.025492 2.15 11.80834 1.538672 284
yworkers 2.211295 0.5907305 1.055366 3.352113 0.5784389 311
under40 3.416431 1.32394 1.018159 5.985173 1.359318 311
ydepratio 0.6024704 0.2148067 0.2170014 1.061042 0.22648 311
growth(-1) 1.638547 3.775536 -15.92021 13.69979 3.091028 286
income(-1) 8.476271 0.6429799 6.917544 9.688134 0.7485066 293
laworder 3.257707 1.220507 1 6 1.106367 284
infla 2.390398 1.388273 -0.8609771 7.992248 1.085104 289
polrepress 3.623778 1.918607 1 7 1.894521 300
polityii 2.547635 6.816182 -10 10 6.67591 296
govstab 7.18231 1.984571 2 11.41667 1.631954 284
schooling 5.100565 2.197367 0.39 10.52 2.438206 248
Openness(-1) 0.7227921 0.3596449 0.1353524 2.046739 0.3542256 299
oil 0.2250804 0.4183083 0 1 0.4086967 311
latitude 856.7022 871.0888 0.138384 3443.929 893.3973 294
rawmat 0.2250804 0.4183083 0 1 0.4430993 311
Table 5: MIC sample summary statisticsOverall Between-country No. of
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Std. Dev. Observations
iprofile 5.650531 1.818406 1.333334 11.80834 1.302637 172
yworkers 2.565982 0.3778817 1.100947 3.502297 0.4076995 231
under40 4.451716 0.9141188 1.147334 6.28129 0.995531 231
ydepratio 0.7984807 0.1639346 0.24265 1.070101 0.1744139 231
growth(-1) 0.3107449 5.074228 -30.602 24.94644 3.052013 220
income(-1) 7.204671 0.5611761 5.560337 8.84851 0.5918507 223
laworder 2.752976 1.119105 0.5666666 5.933334 1.011894 172
infla 2.375351 1.279815 -0.5003149 7.993372 0.905341 202
polrepress 5.045022 1.57316 1.8 7 1.350589 231
polityii -1.247534 5.584025 -9 10 4.501913 223
govstab 6.767103 2.387895 1 10.95001 1.516608 172
schooling 2.54255 1.406149 0.37 6.53 1.459386 149
Openness(-1) 0.5893763 0.3054058 0.1145425 1.615024 0.2941571 227
oil 0.0952381 0.294181 0 1 0.3025317 231
latitude 375.8209 523.5414 0.051984 2528.179 628.4258 220
rawmat 0.4891775 0.5009684 0 1 0.5039393 231
Table 6: LIC sample summary statisticsC Variable Description
Variable Description
Variable Description & Source
govstab Five-year average of the International Country Risk
Guide ”Government Stability” rating, which reﬂects
the government’s ability to carry out its declared pro-
gram(s) and its ability to stay in oﬃce. ”Government
Stability” is the sum of three subcomponents (Gov-
ernment Unity, Legislative Strength and Popular Sup-
port), each with a maximum score of four points (very
low risk) and a minimum score of 0 points (very high
risk).
Source: Political Risk Services Group (2008)
growth(-1) Five-year average of the annual growth rates of real-
per capita GDP of the preceding ﬁve-year period
in constant PPP-adjusted international Dollars (Base
year: 2000).
Source: PWT (2009)
iprofile Five-year average of the rating of the government’s
attitude to inward investment as the sum of three
sub-components, each with a maximum score of four
points (very low risk) and a minimum score of 0 points
(very high risk). The subcomponents are risk of ex-
propriation or contract viability, payment delays and
barriers on the repatriation of proﬁts.
Source: Political Risk Services Group (2008)
Table 7: Variable DescriptionVariable Description
Variable Description & Source
income(-1) Five-year average of the log of real-per capita GDP
of the preceding ﬁve-year period in constant PPP-
adjusted international Dollars (Base year: 2000).
Source: PWT (2009)
infla Five-year average of the log of percentaged inﬂation
rates measured by the consumer price index.
Source: World Bank (2009)
latitude A country’s squared latitude measuring the geograph-
ical distance from the equator.
Source: World Bank (2009)
laworder Five-year average of the rating of Law and Order, as-
sessed separately. The Law sub-component is an as-
sessment of the strength and impartiality of the legal
system, while the Order sub-component is an assess-
ment of popular observance of the law. Both sub-
component comprise zero (low quality) to three points
(high quality).
Source: Political Risk Services Group (2008)
oil Subsumes 28 oil-exporting economies, referring to the
period of 1970 - 2006, using the World Economic
Outlook (WEO) and World Development Indicators
(WDI) as well as Data on oil production and reserves
obtained from BP Statistical Review of World Energy
June 2007 as data sources. The chosen countries are
Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Colombia, Re-
public of Congo, Ecuador, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon,
Indonesia, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Libya, Mexico,
Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia,
Sudan, Syria, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkmenistan,
United Arab Emirates, Venezuela, and Yemen.
Source: Morsy (2009)
Table 8: Variable Description (contd.)Variable Description
Variable Description & Source
Openness(-1) Five-year average of the sum of exports and imports of
goods and services as a share of GDP of the preceding
ﬁve-year period. Exports or imports of goods and ser-
vices represent the value of all goods and other market
services provided to or received from the world. In-
cluded is the value of merchandise, freight, insurance,
travel, and other nonfactor services. Factor and prop-
erty income (formerly called factor services), such as
investment income, interest, and labor income, is ex-
cluded.
Source: World Bank (2009)
polityii Five-year average of the diﬀerence between the DE-
MOC score and the AUTOC score, with a scale rang-
ing from +10 (strongly democratic) to -10 (strongly
autocratic). DEMOC measures the degree of institu-
tionalized democracy conceived as three elements:
1. Presence of institutions and procedures through
which citizens can express eﬀective preferences
about alternative policies and leaders
2. Existence of institutionalized constraints on the
exercise of power by the executive
3. The guarantee of civil liberties to all citizens in
their daily lives and in acts of political partici-
pation
AUTOC is derived from codings of the competitive-
ness of political participation, the regulation of par-
ticipation, the openness and competitiveness of exec-
utive recruitment, and constraints on the chief execu-
tive.
Source: Marshall and Jaggers (2007)
Table 9: Variable Description (contd.)Variable Description
Variable Description & Source
polrepress Five-year average of The Freedom House Political
Rights index, measuring the degree of freedom in the
electoral process, political pluralism and participa-
tion, and functioning of government. Freedom House
rates political rights on a scale of 1 (most free) to 7
(least free).
Source: Freedom House (2009)
rawmat Subsumes major exporters of non-fuel primary prod-
ucts if more than 50% of total exports of goods and
services are non-fuel raw materials between 1988-1992.
Source: World Bank (1995, pp. 250-254)
schooling Initial value of the average years of school attendance
of the total population aged over 25 years.
Source: Barro and Lee (2001)
under40 Initial value of the ratio of the population number
aged 0-40 years to the population number aged over
40 years.
Source: United Nations Population Division (2008)
ydepratio Five-year average of the ratio of the population num-
ber aged 0-14 years to the population number aged
15-64 years.
Source: World Bank (2009)
yworkers Initial value of the ratio of the population number
aged 15-39 years to the population number aged 40-
64 years.
Source: United Nations Population Division (2008)
Table 10: Variable Description (contd.)D Countries
Sample Countries
MIC Algeria, Argentina, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cameroon,
Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El
Salvador, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Honduras, Hungary, Indonesia, Is-
lamic Republic of Iran, Ireland, Israel, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Liberia,
Malaysia, Mexico, Nicaragua, Niger, Panama, Papua New Guinea,
Paraguay, People’s Republic of China, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portu-
gal, Republic of Congo, Romania, Russia, Senegal, South Africa, Spain,
Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad &
Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uruguay, Venezuela, Zimbabwe
LIC Bangladesh, Bolivia, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, Haiti, Hon-
duras, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Liberia, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique,
Nicaragua, Niger, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, People’s Republic of
China, Philippines, Republic of Congo, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka,
Sudan, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe
Table 11: List of Countries included in the samples of low- and middle-income
countries